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Allocating Partnership Liabilities
J. MARTIN BuRKE & MICHAEL K. FtML
Introduction
In the Tax Reform Act of 1984, Congress directed the Treasury to
revise and update its regulations under section 752,1 and to base those
revisions "largely on the manner in which the partners . . . share the
economic risk of loss with respect to partnership debt." 2 It is the thesis
of this article that the congressional directive-and the interest of sim-
plicity, certainty, and coherence in the rules governing partnerships and
tax shelter investments-would be best served by permitting partners
to allocate partnership debt among themselves in whatever manner they
choose. This freedom should be permitted for both recourse and non-
recourse liabilities, and for both general and limited partnerships. Fur-
ther, having once allocated a liability, partners should be free to reallo-
cate it in a different way for a subsequent year, again in whatever way
they choose. The principal concern of the Service in this should simply
be that it be notified of the allocations; to this end, it is appropriate to
require that the allocation of liabilities be stated on each partnership
return.
To the objection that the allocation must have substance, or must
reflect the manner in which the liability will be borne, the answer is that
these concerns are the province of other provisions-most importantly,
sections 465, 704(b), and 704(d). It is unnecessary and unwise to ask
section 752 to duplicate what other provisions are better suited to accom-
plish. Section 752 is properly mechanical and ministerial in operation;
it should depart from that pattern as little as possible.
* J. MARTIN BURKE (A.B., 1970, Gonzaga; J.D., 1974, Montana; LL.M. (in
Taxation), 1982, New York University) is Professor of Law, University of Mon-
tana School of Law. MICHAEL K. FRIEL (B.A., 1966, J.D., 1969, Harvard; LL.M.
(in Taxation), 1982, New York University) is Associate Professor of Law, Willa-
mette University College of Law.
1 Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 79, 98 Stat. 494, 597 (1984). The statutory provision,
which was not made part of the Code, directs that § 752 be applied without re-
gard to the decision of the Claims Court in Raphan v. United States, 3 CI. Ct. 457
(1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 759 F.2d 879 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (discussed
in the text accompanying notes 26 and 27), and provides that in amending the
regulations to reflect this directive, the Treasury shall provide for the treatment
of "guarantees, assumptions, indemnity agreements, and similar arrangements."2 H.R. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 869 (1984), reprinted in 1984-3
(vol. 2) C.B. 123. It was recognized that this directive could not be applied to
"bona fide nonrecourse debt." Id. No "major changes" in the regulations affect-
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An Overview of the Present Rules
Section 752 provides rules for the treatment of liabilities in the part-
nership context. At first glance, they seemed straightforward. In their
application to modem partnerships, however, the rules are neither sim-
ple nor clear. And yet, they play a central role in the taxation of
partners.
Section 752 treats increases or decreases in a partner's share of part-
nership liabilities as money contributions by or distributions to the
partner. Generally, a partner's contribution of money is added to the
basis for his interest in the partnership (his outside basis), and a distri-
bution of money to him is nontaxable, but reduces his outside basis. As
a result, the principal effect of section 752 is to increase and decrease
the outside bases of the partners.
The outside bases of partners are significant in determining the tax
consequences of distributions to partners and sales and exchanges of
partnership interests. Perhaps most important of all, however, section
704(d) limits a partner's deduction for partnership losses to the amount
of his outside basis.' Outside basis thus determines whether a partner
can deduct his share of a partnership loss when the partnership sustains
it, or must, instead, defer the deduction until he acquires additional basis
to absorb the suspended loss. The potential for partnership liabilities to
create outside basis, and thereby increase partners' deductions for part-
nership losses, accounts for much of the popularity of partnerships in
tax shelters. It distinguishes partnerships from both C and S corpora-
tions, where inside liabilities do not affect outside basis.4 A limited part-
ing nonrecourse debt are expected, except that the new regulations might "attempt
to provide more certainty than presently exists." Id.
8 Section 704(d) provides:
A partner's distributive share of partnership loss (including capital loss) shall
be allowed only to the extent of the adjusted basis of such partner's interest in
the partnership at the end of the partnership year in which such loss occurred.
Any excess of such loss over such basis shall be allowed as a deduction at the
end of the partnership year in which such excess is repaid to the partnership.
4 Given the aggregate theory of partnerships, a partner can be viewed as own-
hag an undivided interest in each asset of the partnership and-depending on
the nature of the liability, the partner's status, and the partnership agreement-
as owing a share of each liability of the partnership. A corporate stockholder, in
contrast, is not viewed as having a specific interest in any asset or liability of the
corporation. Thus, stock basis, unlike a partner's basis for his interest, does not
include a share of corporate liabilities. Under § 358, a shareholder's basis for
newly issued stock equals (1) the sum of the cash and the adjusted basis of the
property that the shareholder contributed, (2) less any liability of the shareholder
which the corporation either assumed or took property subject to, (3) increased
by gain to the shareholder on the exchange in which the stock was issued to him.
When stock is sold by a shareholder, the buyer takes a cost basis under § 1012,
unaffected by corporate liabilities.
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nership can often be used to combine liability limitations for the prin-
cipal investors with essentially unlimited pass through of losses in a
way that cannot be accomplished with any other form of organization.
Section 752(a) provides that an increase in a partner's share of part-
nership liabilities, or an increase in a partner's individual liabilities
resulting from his assumption of partnership liabilities, will be con-
sidered as a contribution of money by the partner to the partnership.
Under section 722, a partner's outside basis is increased by any money
he contributes to the partnership. Assume X and Y form a general
partnership in which they will share profits and losses equally. They
each contribute $100,000 to the partnership. The partnership uses the
$200,000 contributed as part payment on the purchase price of prop-
erty costing $500,000. The partnership borrows the other $300,000 on
a recourse basis. X and Y are deemed to have made contributions to
the partnership of $250,000 each, consisting of $100,000 actually con-
tributed and $150,000 deemed contributed under sections 752(a) and
722. Each partner has an outside basis of $250,000.
Conversely, section 752(b) provides that a decrease in a partner's
share of partnership liabilities, or a decrease in his individual liabilities
resulting from a partnership's assumption of the partner's liabilities,
will be considered as a distribution of money to the partner. Under
sections 731(a) (1) and 733, a money distribution to a partner reduces
his outside basis, and generally is taxable only if it exceeds that basis.'
Assume X and Y form a general partnership in which they will share
profits and losses equally. X contributes property (fair market value of
$140,000 and adjusted basis of $100,000) which is encumbered by a
$40,000 indebtedness. The partnership assumes this liability. Y con-
tributes $100,000 cash. Under section 721, X recognizes no gain on
his transfer of the property to the partnership. He is, however, treated
as having a net reduction in liabilities of $20,000,' which in turn results
In this regard, a shareholder in an S corporation is not treated differently from
a shareholder in a C corporation. While a shareholder in an S corporation can
deduct a proportionate share of an operating loss of the corporation, § 1366(d)
limits these losses to "the sum of (A) the adjusted basis of the shareholder's stock
in the S corporation .... and (B) the shareholder's adjusted basis of any in-
debtedness of the S corporation to the shareholder." Because neither of these
basis figures is inflated by corporate liabilities, the § 1366(d) limitation is much
more of a threat than the corresponding rule for partnerships.5 Section 1.752-1(c) of the regulations provides an example of a deemed
money distribution under § 752(b) producing a realized capital gain under
§ 731 (a).
6 Reg. § 1.752-1(b). The transfer to the partnership decreases his individual
liabilities by $40,000, but he acquires a $20,000 share of the partnership's liability
of $40,000.
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in a deemed distribution to X under section 752(b) of $20,000. X's
outside basis in his partnership interest is $80,000: the $100,000 basis
of the transferred property 7 reduced by the $20,000 deemed distri-
bution.8
In both examples, X and Y were assumed to share liabilities equally.
Determining a partner's share of liabilities is seldom so simple. Un-
fortunately, the statute gives no guidance regarding the determination of
a "partner's share of the liabilities of the partnership." The regulations
provide assistance that is critical, yet fairly limited. Section 1.752-1 (e)
of the regulations addresses the matter as follows: First, recourse lia-
bilities-that is, liabilities for which one or more of the partners have
personal liability-are shared by the partners in the same proportions
as they share losses under the partnership agreement. A limited partner,
7 I.R.C. § 722.
8 Under the rule described in the preceding paragraph in text, Y's basis for his
partnership interest is $120,000, the sum of his actual contribution of $100,000
and his $20,000 share of the liability assumed by the partnership.
The regulations offer some modest examples of the mechanics of computing
increases and decreases in a partner's liabilities. They also usefully indicate that
the simultaneous increase and decrease in a partner's liabilities that occur on the
contribution or distribution of encumbered property should be treated as a net
increase or net decrease, as the case may be, rather than as a separate increase
and a separate decrease, the deemed order of which could have significant and
arbitrary tax consequences. Reg. § 1.752-1(a), (b).
9 In full, § 1.752-1 (e) provides:
A partner's share of partnership liabilities shall be determined in accordance
with his ratio for sharing losses under the partnership agreement, In the case
of a limited partnership, a limited partner's share of partnership liabilities shall
not exceed the difference between his actual contribution credited to him by
the partnership and the total contribution which he is obligated to make under
the limited partnership agreement. However, where none of the partners have
any personal liability with respect to a partnership liability (as in the case of a
mortgage on real estate acquired by the partnership without the assumption by
the partnership or any of the partners of any liability on the mortgage), then
all partners, including limited partners, shall be considered as sharing such lia-
bility under § 752(c) in the same proportion as they share the profits. The
provisions of this paragraph may be illustrated by the following example:
Example. G is a general partner and L is a limited partner in partnership
GL. Each makes equal contributions of $20,000 cash to the partnership
upon its formation. Under the terms of the partnership agreement they are
to share profits equally but L's liabilities are limited to the extent of his con-
tribution. Subsequently, the partnership pays $10,000 for real property
which is subject to a mortgage of $5,000. Neither the partnership nor any
of the partners assume any liability on the mortgage. The basis of such
property to the partnership is $15,000. The basis of G and L for their
partnership interests is increased by $2,500 each, since each partner's share
of the partnership liability (the $5,000 mortgage) has increased by that
amount. However, if the partnership had assumed the mortgage so that G
had become personally liable thereunder, G's basis for his interest would
have been increased by $5,000 and L's basis would remain unchanged.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
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however, does not share in a recourse liability unless the partnership
agreement requires him to make one or more additional contributions
to the partnership. In such a case, his share is restricted to the sum of
the additional contributions that may be demanded of him. Second,
nonrecourse liabilities-that is, liabilities for which none of the partners
has any personal liability-are shared by all partners in the proportions
in which they share partnership profits."0
Rationale Underlying the Present Rules
The general rules of section 1.752-1 (e) appear simple and indicate
the Treasury's effort to allocate liabilities in a manner reflecting eco-
nomic substance. Allocation of recourse liabilities in proportion to the
partners' loss sharing ratios can be explained this way: When a partner-
ship sustains losses exceeding the aggregate of the partners' contribu-
tions and the accumulated income of the partnership, the excess is a loss
of funds owed to creditors. Thus, a recourse liability can appropriately
be allocated to those partners, whether general or limited, who, either
by state law or the partnership agreement, can be called upon to pay
partnership creditors. The increase in basis resulting from this alloca-
tion assures that the partners bearing the risk of loss on recourse lia-
bilities will have basis sufficient to permit the deduction of losses at-
tributable to this debt.
A simple example demonstrates the theory. X and Y form a limited
partnership. X, the general partner, contributes $100. Y, the limited
partner, contributes $1,000, and is not obligated to contribute further
to the partnership. The partnership borrows $900 on a recourse basis
to purchase a piece of equipment. The partnership agreement allocates
losses first to Y (the limited partner) up to the amount of his contribu-
tion, and provides that losses beyond this amount are allocable to X. 11
The partnership generates no income, but sustains losses of $1,500, all
of which are deductible by the partnership. Under the partnership
agreement, Y deducts the first $1,000 of losses and X deducts the re-
maining $500. Because the first $1,100 of loss exhausts the partners'
10 If the partners agreed that all losses were to be allocated to Y, losses in ex-
cess of $1,000 would nevertheless be allocated to X, rather than to Y. Section
704(a) and (b) provides that while partners are generally free to allocate partner-
ship income, deductions, losses, and credits in whatever way they choose, an
agreed upon allocation is denied tax effect if it lacks "substantial economic effect."
Because Y cannot suffer an economic loss in excess of his $1,000 contribution and
because partnership losses in excess of $1,000 fall economically on X, an alloca-
tion of more than $1,000 of loss to Y has no economic effect and would be dis-
regarded. See Reg. § § 1.704-1 (b) (1) (i), 1.704-1 (b) (2) (ii) (a), 1.704-1 (b) (3).
"
1 The present regulations are silent with respect to whether nonrecourse debts
in a general partnership will be allocated on the basis of profit ratios or loss ratios.
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contributions, the last $400 of loss is a loss of borrowed money. X, the
general partner, would bear this loss from his personal assets if the part-
nership were to dissolve at this point. Since X will bear any loss in excess
of the partners' aggregate contributions, it is appropriate that X be allo-
cated the entire $900 of recourse indebtedness. This allocation would
give X an outside basis of $1,000, enabling him to deduct the loss allo-
cated to him.
Nonrecourse liabilities, by contrast, cannot appropriately be allocated
among partners in the proportions in which they share losses. When a
partnership loses money it has borrowed without recourse, the lender,
not the partners, bears the economics loss. Section 752, however, draws
no distinction between recourse and nonrecourse liabilities, and thus
causes the outside bases of the partners to be increased for nonrecourse
as well as recourse liabilities. In doing this, section 752 incorporates the
principle of Crane v. Commissioner "-generally equating nonrecourse
liability with recourse liability for basis purposes-and places a partner
in a position comparable to that of an individual owner of encumbered
property.
The application of the Crane doctrine in the partnership context is
complicated by the necessity of allocating nonrecourse liabilities among
the partners. The regulations require that a nonrecourse liability be
allocated according to the profit sharing ratio, recognizing that if the
nonrecourse indebtedness is to be paid at all, it will be paid from part-
nership profits and capital, not from personal assets of partners. Because
the sharing of profits is central to the existence of a partnership and be-
cause all partners' expectations of profits are frustrated when there is a
loss associated with a nonrecourse liability, such a loss is borne eco-
nomically by the partners (to the extent it is borne by the partners at
all) in proportion to their shares of profits. Therefore, the nonrecourse
allocation rules are arguably justifiable.
The rules of section 1.752-1 (e) of the regulations thus seek to reflect
economic substance by allocating liablities to the partners bearing the
losses associated with the liabilities. The premises underlying the rules,
however, are not necessarily borne out in reality.
First, the recourse liability allocation rules assume that the partner-
ship may default on its obligations, thus exposing personal assets of part-
ners to creditors' claims. Several factors, however, make the possibility
of enforcement of personal liability small in most cases. Creditors usu-
ally try to protect themselves by demanding adequate security. Assume
a limited partnership borrows money from the Z Lending Bank. The
partnership gives a recourse note to Z. Z also receives a first mortgage
12331 U.S. 1 (1947).
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on partnership property. If the value of the security significantly exceeds
the indebtedness and there is only a remote possibility that the security
will ever substantially decrease in value, as is often the case, the possi-
bility of enforcement of personal liability is minimal. This possibility
is also remote if the partnership is sufficiently profitable so that the loan
is almost certain to be repaid from partnership profits. The costs to the
lender of enforcing personal liability, furthermore, may be so large as to
discourage it from seeking personal payment from the partners even if
the security and partnership profits both prove insufficient to satisfy the
debt.
Nevertheless, section 1.752-1 (e) allocates the entire liability among
the partners who could be called upon to pay if the partnership de-
faulted-the general partners and those limited partners, if any, who are
obligated to make further contributions to the partnership. If there is lit-
tle possibility of any partner being required to pay from personal assets,
all partners, including limited partners with no obligation to contribute
further to the partnership, will effectively contribute to the retirement of
the debt because partnership earnings will be the primary source for
repayment of the debt. In these cases, allocation of the liability only
to the partners who could be required to make personal payment does
not reflect economic substance. The regulations' distinction between
recourse and nonrecourse indebtedness is artificial and distorts compu-
tation of a partner's outside basis.
A second, and perhaps more fundamental, difficulty with the liability
sharing rules is that they fail to account for the differences between eco-
nomic losses and tax losses. Were only economic losses deductible, the
recourse sharing rules would be justifiable, and the nonrecourse rules
would necessarily be arbitrary since the lender, and not the partners,
would bear the risk of loss. Losses deductible for tax purposes, how-
ever, may not represent actual economic losses. Indeed, taxpayers some-
times report losses for tax purposes when they have economic profits.
For example, during a tax year, a partnership may make an economic
profit but, because of substantial depreciation deductions or depletion
allowances, show a loss for tax purposes. Tax shelters-frequently
organized as limited partnerships-exploit discrepancies between tax
losses and economic losses.
Since lenders generally try to minimize the possibilities of default, the
liability sharing rules are significant primarily as a means of allowing
partners to deduct artificial tax losses incurred where the potential for
economic loss is remote. Thus, while the liability allocation rules-
specifically, the recourse liability sharing rules-may in principle seek
to reflect economic substance, that end is frustrated by the nature of the
federal tax system and by the practical realities of financing.
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Problems in Application
In addition to the questionable economic basis of the liability alloca-
tion rules, application of the rules has presented significant difficulties
for the courts and the Treasury, often producing results at odds with
economic substance.
Guarantee and Indemnification Arrangements
Rigid application of the regulation's distinction between recourse and
nonrecourse liabilities has led to allocations that can fairly be character-
ized as arbitrary. This has been particularly true in cases involving in-
demnification arrangements and guarantees. Revenue Ruling 69-223,11
Raphan v. United States,4 and a recent technical advice memorandum 15
illustrate the difficulties the courts and the Service have had in applying
the regulation in this context. These authorities suggest the necessity of
significant revision of section 1.752-1 (e)-as directed by the Congress
in the Tax Reform Act of 1984-if any semblance of economic sub-
stance is to be preserved in liability allocations.
In Revenue Ruling 69-223, the Service considered whether an in-
demnification agreement entitled a limited partner to a share of a re-
course liability of the partnership. The limited partner had agreed to
indemnify a general partner if the general partner "should be required
to pay more than his pro rata share of partnership liabilities." 10 The
partnership agreement said that the indemnification arrangement was
"not intended for the benefit of third party creditors," 17 and that the
limited partner was not liable for losses in excess of his initial capital
contribution. The certificate of limited partnership provided that the
limited partner was not required to make any contribution beyond his
initial contribution.
The Service held that none of the partnership's recourse liability could
be allocated to the limited partner. It noted that under the regulations,
a limited partner shares in a recourse liability only if the limited partner
is required to make an additional contribution to the partnership."' The
indemnification agreement failed to qualify the limited partner for a
share of the liability because it was made between the general and limited
partners "in their individual capacities." '1 The limited partner had no
13 1969-1 C.B. 184.
14 3 C1. Ct. 457 (1984), af0'd in part, rev'd in part, 759 F.2d 879 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
15 TAM 8504005 (Sept. 28, 1984).
16 1969-1 C.B. 184.
171d.
18 Id. at 185.
19 Id.
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further obligation "to the partnership." 20 Therefore, the limited part-
ner's share of the liability was held to be zero. The general partner was
allocated the entire liability.
In a 1984 technical advice memorandum, 2 ' the Service applied the
regulations in an equally rigid manner, holding that limited partners
who guaranteed 80% of a recourse loan were not entitled to add any
portion of the liability to the bases of their partnership interests. Under
the terms of the guarantee, the creditor was not required to foreclose
first upon the partnership property securing the indebtedness, but could
proceed directly against the guarantors. The limited partnership agree-
ment, however, stated that the limited partners' liability was limited to
their contributions, and that creditors could not look to the "separate
assets of any limited partner for satisfaction of a partnership debt." 2
Neither the partnership agreement nor the certificate of limited partner-
ship "require[d] any additional contributions or guarantees from any of
the limited partners.". 3 Other evidence, however, established that be-
fore becoming partners, the limited partners understood that they would
be required to guarantee the partnership liability. At least one potential
investor chose not to invest because he did not want to undertake the
liability associated with guaranteeing the partnership debt.
The Service, nonetheless, rejected the argument that the guarantees
should be treated as part of the partnership agreement. Because neither
the partnership agreement nor the certificate of partnership required
additional contributions by the limited partners, the Service concluded
that "the guaranty agreements executed by the partners were made out-
side the partnership agreement." 24 Accordingly, the limited partners
were found not to be obligated for additional contributions, and thus
were allocated none of the liability.2-
Revenue Ruling 69-223 and the technical advice memorandum re-
flect a slavish adherence to formality, and fail to reflect the spirit of eco-
nomic substance underlying the regulations. In both situations, the
Service, in allocating recourse liabilities just to general partners, failed
20 d. See Pritchett v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 580 (1985) and Abramson v.
Commissioner, 86 T.C. No. 23 (Mar. 12, 1986).21 TAM 8504005 (Sept. 28, 1984).
22 1d.
231d.
24 d.
25The Service relied on two Tax Court memorandum decisions, Brown v. Com-
missioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 725 (1980), and Block v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M.
(CCH) 546 (1980), as authority for its conclusion. These cases held that the
guaranteeing of a partnership liability, outside the partnership agreement, does not
transform the debt into part of the "total contribution which (the limited partner]
is obligated to make under the limited partnership agreement." Reg. § 1.752-
1(e).
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to recognize that limited partners had also exposed their personal assets
to liability. In the technical advice memorandum, the creditor, in the
event of default, could have proceeded immediately against the assets
of the limited partners who guaranteed the loan. In Revenue Ruling
69-223, the limited partner's liability to the recourse lender was less
direct. Nevertheless, if there were a loss attributable to the indebtedness,
the limited partner's personal assets would, albeit indirectly, be relied
upon to satisfy at least part of the loss. Certainly, if the possibility that
one will be called upon to pay a liability is the justification for allocation
of liability under the rule for recourse debt, the limited partners in
Revenue Ruling 69-223 and the technical advice memorandum were en-
titled to a share of the liability. The refusal to givp the limited partners
any basis increase because the partnership agreement did not require the
limited partners to make additional contributions suggests confusion as
to the purpose of the liability sharing rules, and provides a trap for the
unwary.
The Service's position in the ruling and the memorandum is especially
curious in light of the government's argument in Raphan v. United
States."8 Raphan addressed a related issue: Did a general partner's
guarantee of an otherwise nonrecourse loan create a personal liability
that would preclude limited partners from sharing in the liability?
The government argued that because guarantee of the loan by the gen-
eral partners created personal liability, the liability sharing rule for non-
recourse debt was inapplicable.
The Claims Court rejected the argument, reasoning that in guarantee-
ing the loan, the general partners had acted in a nonpartner capacity. If
forced to pay the lender, the guaranteeing partners would be subrogated
to the rights and remedies of the lender, including the right to foreclose
on the collateral. If there were a foreclosure by the guaranteeing gen-
eral partners, the interest of every partner would be diminished. The
courts concluded that the guaranteeing partners should only be viewed
as creditors of the partnership. "The guaranteeing of a partnership debt
does not make the guaranteeing partner 'personally liable' under Treas.
Reg. § 1.752-1 (e) and does not preclude the remaining partners from
sharing in the step up in basis on account of such debt." 27
Both Congress and the Federal Circuit recognized the merit of the
Service's position in Raphan. Congress prospectively overruled
Raphan,28 and the Federal Circuit reversed the Claims Court.29 Con-
26 3 CI. Ct. 457 (1984), afl'd in part, rev'd in part, 759 F.2d 879 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
27 Id. at 466.
28 Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 79, 98 Stat. 494, 597 (1984). The legislative over-
turning of Raphan was effective as of March 1, 1984. H.R. R P. No. 861, 98th
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gress and the Federal Circuit recognized that guarantees are of consid-
erable importance if one is anxious to assure that liabilities are allocated
to partners who will bear a loss, if any, attributable to recourse lia-
bilities. 30
If the general partner's guarantee should have been considered a sig-
nificant factor in the allocation of the "nonrecourse liability" in Raphan,
however, should not this same treatment have been given the indemnifica-
tion agreement in Revenue Ruling 69-223 and the limited partners'
guarantees in the technical advice memorandum? The provision that
legislatively overturns Raphan-section 79 of the Tax Reform Act of
1984--directs the Treasury to provide by regulation for "the treatment
of guarantees, assumptions, indemnity agreements, and similar arrange-
ments." The legislative history of the provision states that the regula-
tions "will be based largely on the manner in which the partners, and
persons related to the partners, share the economic risk of loss with
respect to partnership debt (other than bona fide nonrecourse debt)." 31
Cong., 2d Sess. 869 (1984), reprinted in 1984-3 (vol. 2) C.B. 123. No "infer-
ence... regarding the validity of the Raphan decision for transactions prior to
March 1, 1984" was intended. Id.
29759 F.2d 879 (Fed. Cir. 1985). According to the Federal Circuit, the gen-
eral partners had not acted at arm's length in guaranteeing the loan, but, rather,
had acted as partners. That the guarantee was not mentioned in the partnership
agreement was not determinative. From an economic substance standpoint, the
position of the Federal Circuit and the congressional position in the 1984 Tax
Reform Act are correct. Having guaranteed the nonrecourse liability, the general
partners subjected their personal assets to the claims of the creditor. If a loss
attributable to the liability were sustained, the general partners would bear that
loss. The liability should therefore be allocated only to the general partners and
not shared among all the partners.
30 If, in Raphan, the guarantee had been made by the limited partner, the
limited partner would bear the economic risk of loss and should therefore be allo-
cated the entire liability. Congress presumably would recognize that as the appro-
priate result. The Staff of the Joint Committee in its explanation of § 79 of the
Tax Reform Act of 1984 said: "When a limited partner guarantees a liability,
the regulations will not shift the basis attributable to that liability away from the
limited partner as a result of the guarantee." STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N,
98TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENmAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAx REFORM AcT oF
1984, 251 (Comm. Print 1984). See Abramson v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. No.
23 (Mar. 12, 1986) (limited partner's pro rata guarantee of a partnership's non-
recourse obligation entitled the limited partner to include a pro rata portion of the
obligation in his partnership basis).
A related issue is what result obtains if the nonrecourse debt is guaranteed by
a person who is not a partner. Does it matter whether, and in what way, the
guarantor is related to one of the partners? From an economic substance stand-
point, it might sometimes be appropriate to consider the relationship between the
guarantor and a partner because, through the related party's guarantee, the part-
ner might effectively subject his own assets to claims of the creditor.
31 H.R. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 869 (1984), reprinted in 1984-3
(vol. 2) C.B. 123.
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Specifically, it is suggested: "When a limited partner guarantees a [non-
recourse] liability, the regulations will not shift the basis attributable to
that liability away from the limited partner as a result of the guarantee." 82
The congressional intention with respect to other situations, including
those of Revenue Ruling 69-223 and the technical advice memorandum,
is not clearly expressed. Logically, a limited partner's agreement to
indemnify a general partner on recourse debt or a limited partner's
guarantee of a recourse debt should be effective to shift basis to that
partner. More generally, the legislative directive will require a rethink-
ing of the approaches taken in the revenue ruling and the technical advice
memorandum.
Economic Substance and the Contingent Obligation
of Limited Partners
Limited Partners Obligated for Additional
Contributions
The revenue ruling and the technical advice memorandum discussed
above held that limited partners were not entitled to share in recourse
liabilities because the partnership agreements failed to require additional
contributions from them. Even where additional contributions are re-
quired from limited partners, however, the Service has sometimes denied
them the right to share in the allocation of these liabilities.
In a 1983 technical advice memorandum,3 3 the limited partnership
agreement provided that the limited partners could pay for their interests
in the partnership in several ways, including a "Letter of Credit method"
whereby the limited partner would immediately pay 20% of the sub-
scription price in cash, give a recourse note due within a year for an
additional 20% of the subscription price, and execute and deliver a
transferable "Letter of Credit" for the balance of the subscription
price.34 The letters of credit were to be the primary security for a
"Loan" which the partnership was to obtain from a bank (the "Lending
Bank"), and had to be issued by banks acceptable to both the general
partners and the Lending Bank. A limited partner electing the letter of
credit method was also required to sign an "Assumption Agreement"
"by which the limited partner [would] assume and promise to pay his
proportionate share of principal, interest and other charges, if any, due
under the Loan." 15 The partnership pledged the assumption agree-
ments and letters of credit as security for the loan.
32 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL EXPLA-
NATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1984, 251 (Comm. Print 1984).
83 TAM 8404012 (Oct. 13, 1983).
84 Id.
85 Id.
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One of the issues considered by the Service in the technical advice
memorandum was whether a portion of the liability for repayment of the
loan was allocable to a limited partner who signed the letter of credit and
assumption agreement. Although it recognized the obligation of the
limited partner to make further contributions to the limited partnership
under the letter of credit and assumption agreement, the Service con-
cluded that a section 752 allocation of liability to the limited partner
would not be appropriate. According to the Service, the limited part-
ner's obligation to make additional contributions was too contingent to
justify a basis increase.30 Because the principal of the loan was not due
for four years and no interest payment was due for one year, "the obliga-
tion to make any additional contributions to the partnership was indefinite
and contingent .... [T]he partnership could have generated sufficient
income to pay the Loan either through income from operations or sale
of assets prior to the due date of the Loan."37 The Service further con-
cluded that the liability could not be treated as a nonrecourse debt in
which limited partners were entitled to share because their obligation to
contribute took the liability out of the nonrecourse category. While it is
not entirely clear from the memorandum, the liability was apparently
allocated only to the general partners.
In a 1984 technical advice memorandum,"8 issued just a few months
after the memorandum discussed in the two preceding paragraphs, the
Service reached a similar conclusion. The partnership agreement in
the 1984 memorandum provided that those lending money to the part-
nership could collect a certain amount from the limited partners if the
partnership failed to repay the loan. The Service concluded that this
provision did not allow any portion of the partnership's recourse liabili-
ties to be allocated to limited partners. According to the Service, the
"obligation [of the limited partners] to contribute must be fixed and
absolute in both time and amount under the partnership agreement." 3
The Service held that the limited partners' obligation to contribute was
contingent because they would only have -to make additional contribu-
tions "if the additional amounts [were] necessary to pay any of the part-
nership's loan obligations." 40
The conclusions of the Service in these memoranda undermine further
the economic foundation of the regulations. That the profits of the
partnership might have been sufficient to service the debt hardly seems
an appropriate basis for finding that the liability undertaken by the
limited partners was too contingent to justify a basis increase. If the
86 Id.37 Id.3 8 TAM 8421004 (Jan. 25, 1984).
39 1d.
40Id.
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possibility of adequate profits renders a limited partner's obligation to
make further contributions too contingent to justify a basis increase,
the regulations are wrong in allowing general partners to increase their
bases for recourse obligations. In many, if not most, cases, recourse
loans are adequately secured. Given the underlying security and the
cash flow of the partnership business, the likelihood of a general partner
ever paying a recourse obligation of his partnership from personal assets
is small. It is doubtful, indeed, that the limited partners' liability in
these two technical advice memoranda was any more contingent than
that of a general partner in a typical recourse liability context.
The unreasonableness of the holdings in the memoranda is further
shown by the fact that they apparently allowed the general partners to
include the entire amount of the liabilities in their bases. The liabilities
were not contingent; the creditors had a right to be paid. Thus, the only
question was to whom the liabilities would be allocated for purposes of
section 752. The holdings that no portion of the liabilities was allocable
to limited partners necessarily caused the liabilities to be allocated en-
tirely to the general partners. To allocate them entirely to the general
partners, when limited partners would be called on to pay if any partner-
ship liability were enforced, is unreasonable and entirely inconsistent with
any notion of economic substance.41
Other Characterization Problems
The problems encountered by the courts and the Service regarding
guarantees, indemnification arrangements, and contingencies are only
a few of the problems created by section 1.751-1 (e) of the regulations.
Other significant questions must also be addressed. The legislative his-
tory of section 79 of the Tax Reform Act of 1984, for example, indi-
cates that the regulations to be promulgated on partnership liabilities
41 Literal application of the recourse liability sharing rules can produce a simi-
larly unjustified result where limited partners are allowed to pay for their interests
in installments. Assume a limited partnership authorizes payment of the sub-
scription price for limited partnership interests to be made in installments. Some
of the limited partners pay in full for their interests in the partnership, while
others take advantage of the installment arrangement. Assume the partnership
borrows on a recourse basis. Section 1.752-1 (e) of the regulations would allocate
the liability among the general partners and those limited partners who are obli-
gated to make additional contributions to the partnership. Under the partnership
agreement and local law, however, the limited partners would most likely be re-
quired to complete their contributions before liability for unpaid partnership debt
would finally fall on the general partners. If this is s-, the economic burden of the
first dollars of partnership debt is borne by the limited partters who are obligated
for additional contributions, and economic substance can only be accurately re-
flected by allocating liabilities to limited partners exclusively, up to the amounts
due from them.
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should deal with nonrecourse loans made by limited partners. 42 The
Service has recently dealt by ruling with the treatment of partnership
liabilities that are recourse in part, and nonrecourse in part.43 We do
not comprehensively catalogue these issues; they are mentioned only to
suggest that the unanswered questions under the present regulations are
legion.44
Problems Associated With Status of Partners,
General or Limited
In addition to requiring characterization of a liability as recourse or
nonrecourse, the regulation rules necessitate that every partnership and
every partner be characterized as general or limited.
While determination of whether a partner is general or limited is typi-
cally straightforward, serious problems can arise. For example, the
issue appears to refer to local law. Under the Uniform Limited Partner-
ship Act in force in most states, a limited partner becomes a general
partner if he engages in excessive management activities; "I the boundary
lines here are uncertain, and may be established only well after the fact.
Do basis shifts thereby result? Also, it is not uncommon for a partner
to be both a general partner and a limited partner in the same partner-
ship. Is the limited partner status to be ignored for basis purposes with
respect to recourse liabilities? Does the partner have a single basis in
42The Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation states in its explanation of the
1984 Act: "Mhe basis attributable to a nonrecourse loan made to the partnership
by a partner would be treated in the same manner as basis attributable to a bone
[sic] fide third party nonrecourse loan which that partner guaranteed." STAF' OF
JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 98rH CONG., 2D SEss., GENa.A ExPLANATION OF THE
TAx REFom AcT oF 1984, 251 (Comm. Print 1984). Elsewhere, the staff ex-
planation says that a limited partner guarantee of nonrecourse debt should not
have the effect of shifting basis attributable to the debt away from the partner.
Id. The intention apparently is that when a limited partner makes a nonrecourse
loan, the partnership liability on the loan should be allocated among the partners,
including the lending partner, by the rule applied to nonrecourse debt owed to
third parties, and the fact that the lender is a limited partner should not affect the
allocation. There surely are numerous other issues relating to loans made by
partners that could be addressed by the new regulations.
43The Service has ruled that two separate liabilities are created for purposes
of § 752, one recourse and one nonrecourse. Rev. Rul. 84-118, 1984-2 C.B. 120,
amended by Ann. 85-19, 1985-5 I.R.B. 31 (Feb. 4, 1985). The Tax Court had
previously indicated that such a liability should be treated as a recourse liability
for basis sharing purposes. Long v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1045 (1981).
44For an excellent discussion of a broader range of § 752 problems than those
summarized herein, as well as a discussion of the discontinuities among §§ 752,
704(b), and 465, see Rosen & Kalish, The Risky Basis for Partnership Alloca-
tions, 38 TAx LAw. 119 (1984).
45 UNr. LTD. PARTNmSnp AcT, 6 U.L. 582 (West).
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the partnership, as the Service has ruled,46 or does each interest have
its own basis?
Again, it is possible to answer each of these questions by assessing the
liability, if any, a partner has with respect to each indebtedness. To the
extent personal assets of a partner may be looked to in satisfying part-
nership debt, a share of the liability should be allocated to the partner
under section 752 in computing the partner's outside basis. The focus
on whether a partner is general or limited may be misplaced.
Measurement Problems
These problems may be the least complex of the issues raised by
section 1.752-1 (e) of the regulations. The regulation allocates liabilities
among partners according to profit and loss ratios. Because complex
sharing and allocation arrangements are typical of present day part-
nerships, the determination of profit and loss sharing ratios is often ex-
tremely difficult, if not impossible. Understandably, section 1.752-1 (e)
provides no guidance in ascertaining the ratios. Indeed, contemporary
partnership arrangements are so complex that any standard, short of
something so broad as to be of little value, would be deficient.
Assume a general partnership consisting of X, Y, and Z. The part-
ners specially allocate all depreciation deductions to X for the first ten
years. Otherwise, all partnership items are shared equally. Assume the
special allocation to X has substantial economic effect under section
704(b). It would not be accurate to say that the partners share profits
and losses equally. Because partner X initially has a greater share of
partnership deductions, it would not be correct to allocate only one third
of partnership liabilities to X. To pass muster under section 704(b),
the allocation of the depreciation to X must be reflected by charges
against his capital account, and the partnership agreement must obligate
X to make up any deficit in his capital account that might exist when
the partnership liquidates. 4 The allocation thus exposes X to the risk of
economic loss beyond the risk borne by the other partners, and an allo-
cation of liabilities reflective of economic substance must give more of
the liabilities to X. But, how much more?
If one could quantify the impact of the depreciation allocation on the
46 Rev. Rul. 84-53, 1984-1 C.B. 159.
47 The Treasury has recently issued final regulations stating that an allocation
of gross income, loss, or deduction has economic effect under § 704(b) only if
(1) each item allocated to a partner is reflected in his capital account, (2) capital
accounts are followed in distributing partnership assets on liquidation, and (3) a
partner whose capital account is in deficit when liquidation occurs must make a
contribution to the partnership sufficient to make up the deficit. Reg. § 1.704-1 (b) (2) (ii) (b).
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current year's loss sharing arrangement, the current year's loss sharing
arrangement could be controlling for the section 752 allocation made
for the year. This approach would entail shifts in the allocation from
year to year. Alternatively, an allocation might be computed at the out-
set that would take account of both the special allocation in the first ten
years and the shift of the depreciation deductions in the eleventh year.
Which approach is correct? Does either approach lead out of the un-
manageable computational conundrum? The regulations, case law, and
administrative rulings shed no light on this dilemma.
The example is relatively simple. Many partnership arrangements
involve numerous special item allocations, as well as complex bottom
line allocations. Provisions that flip allocations from limited partners to
general partners at particular times are common. If accurate measure-
ment of the partnership's loss sharing ratio is difficult in this simple ex-
ample, how much more difficult is the measurement task when multiple
allocations and flips are present? Any effort to distill from these arrange-
ments -a single profit or loss ratio necessarily involves a high degree of
arbitrariness and guesswork.
Congress apparently recognized the difficult measurement problems
presented by the present regulation. The legislative history of the 1984
congressional directive indicates that the Treasury need not make
"major changes" in the manner in which the partners share nonrecourse
liabilities, but then states that the Treasury "may attempt to provide
more certainty than presently exists." 48 Measuring loss ratios for pur-
poses of sharing of recourse liabilities is no less complicated than mea-
suring profit ratios for purposes of sharing nonrecourse liabilities. Ulti-
mately, the Treasury may find a way to simplify determination of the
profit and loss sharing ratios, but one's confidence in the economic
soundness of the determination will likely be far from absolute.
ALI and New York State Bar Association Proposals
ALI Proposal
Considering the importance of tne section 752 allocation rules, it is
not surprising that Congress and practitioners alike have been concerned
with the uncertainties and inconsistencies of section 1.752-1 (e) of the
regulations. Indicative of the significance of the problem is the atten-
tion paid to partnership liabilities by the American Law Institute in its
subchapter K project.4 " After providing examples of the many prob-
4 8 ILR. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 869 (1984), reprinted in 1984-3
(vol. 2) C.B. 123.
49 ALI, FEDERAL I'com TAX PRoJEcT, PROPOSALS ON THE TAXATION OF
PARTNms (1984).
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lems created by the present liability allocation rules, the ALl proposes
that the present rules be retained, but with certain significant modi-
fications.
The most important of the recommended changes relates to the shar-
ing of nonrecourse liabilities. The ALI suggests several alternatives that
could replace the regulation rule for these liabilities. Among the possi-
bilities are:
(1) An "arbitrary rule, e.g., that current profits interests at any given
point in time control the allocation of nonrecourse debt." The
argument for this rule is "that no particular rule will uniformly
reach a correct result and it is best to have a clear bright line." 50
(2) "Nonrecourse debt could be allocated based on a detailed facts-
and-circumstances analysis, to try to determine for a given part-
nership the appropriate allocation of debt for each particular
year. Such an analysis could take into account relative obliga-
tions to make contributions, current and residual distribution
provisions, and profit-and-loss allocations." "I
The ALI recommends neither of these alternatives. Indeed, they can be
viewed as nothing more than possible interpretations of the present rule.
The measurement problems previously discussed are present in both.
While the first alternative limits the measurement problem by focus-
ing solely on the profit sharing rat..os for the current year, quantifying
even these ratios would not always be simple. As the ALI recognizes,
"there may be different profit interests at different levels of income, and
there may be no profits at all in the particular year for which liabilities
are being allocated." "2 The ALI calls this first alternative "arbitrary." 51
The second alternative simply summarizes the variables that must be
considered in determining profit sharing ratios once the focus is broad-
ened beyond the current year. The very vagueness of this alternative
is indicative of the difficulties of measurement created by the current
standard.
In lieu of the present standard, the ALI suggests the following rule:
Nonrecourse liabilities shall be allocated among partners as the partners
determine in the partnership agreement if the allocation bears a reasonable
relationship to the partner's interests in the partnership apart from such
allocation. In the absence of such an allocation, such liabilities shall be
allocated at any time in accordance with the current profit-sharing ratios
for operating income of the partnership then in effect.0 4
50 Id. at 269-70.
51 Id. at 270.52 Id. at 271.
53 Id. at 269.
541d. at 278.
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The ALI justifies this standard on three grounds. First, the standard
provides "relative certainty and simplicity." 11 Second, if strict rules for
allocating gross income and deductions are provided under section
704(b),16 "there seem to be no important policies served by a strict rule
for allocating liabilities among partners in computing their basis for
their partnership interests." 11 Third, "while practitioners often plan
around the present uncertainties, many unnecessary uncertainties remain
that have simply not surfaced because of low audit coverage of the
issue." 18
The ALI standard, while at first glance quite flexible, exhibits a ten-
tativeness that makes it as uncerta;n and difficult of application as the
present rule. The ALI proposal permits the partners to allocate non-
recourse liabilities only in ways that bear "reasonable relationship[s] to
the partners' interests in the partnership."" The official comments on
the proposed standard say that the "reasonable relationship" require-
ment refers to a partner's economic interest.00 Is not the economic in-
terest of a partner essentially the basis for the present sharing rules? In
determining a partner's economic interest will not one be required to
quantify the impact of various special allocations? If so, the ALI stan-
dard is simply the current standard in disguise.
While the ALI points to proposed rules under section 704(b) as
negating the need for stringent allocation rules under section 752, it
declines to follow through on the implications of that observation. The
ALI comments:
[Ain amendment to the partnership agreement to modify a previously
agreed to allocation of nonrecourse debt will only be recognized as bearing
a reasonable relationship to the partners' interests if such change bears a
reasonable relationship to other changed terms in the partnership agree-
ment. This restriction is designed to avoid partners shifting the allocation
of the debt from year to year, depending solely upon the best tax results
to them for that year.6 '
Section 704(b), strictly applied, together with the deduction limiting
rules of section 704(d) and section 465, greatly limit, if not eliminate,
the abuse potential which concerns the ALL
More disappointing than the ALL's very cautious proposal concern-
55 Id. at 270.
56 The ALI suggests rules for allocating gross income and deductions similar to
those in the § 704(b) regulations. Compare id. at 251-52, with Reg. § 1.704-
1 (b) (2) (i).57 Id. at 270.
58Id.
59 Id. at 278.
60 Id. at 279.
611d. at 280.
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ing nonrecourse indebtedness is its failure to address the serious mea-
surement problems it recognizes in the current rules for allocating
recourse liabilities. The proposed standard for the allocation of nonre-
course indebtedness, as limited as it is, is not recommended for recourse
indebtedness. Rather, the ALI embraces the present rule for recourse
liabilities, thus accepting the basic premise of the present regulation that
it is appropriate to distinguish between recourse and nonrecourse debt in
allocating basis among partners. In supporting the continuation of this
distinction, the drafters of the ALI study reasoned:
Recourse liabilities may well have to be funded by the partners, and the
allocation rules for losses should, in general, allocate losses to partners who
may ultimately have to fund the recourse debt. Also, as discussed above,
since contingent liabilities for recourse debt can be manipulated for tax
purposes, it seems unwise to expand the possible allocation to limited
partners of basis for a recourse debt beyond the present rule.0 2
The ALI proposal thus continues the present state of uncertainty,
doing so out of a concern for economic substance. The ALI itself, how-
ever, recognizes that the present allocation rules do not always assure
that the partner who may actually bear loss associated with recourse
liability will necessarily be allocated the liability. In light of its own
proposals for strict allocation rules under section 704(b), together with
the failure of the present standard to assure economic substance, the
ALI's proposal seems quite modest, and does not satisfactorily address
the serious application problems associated with section 752.
The ALI proposal does, however, address two problems associated
with section 1.752-1 (e) of the regulations. First, the ALI proposes
that "if a limited partner has personal liability for a partnership debt,
either by agreement with the lender or by having agreed to indemnify
another partner against liability, or otherwise, he shall be allocated a
share of such debt as if he were a general partner." 03 If the current
standards for the allocation of liabilities are to be retained, this proposal
moves in the right direction. In contrast to current law, it recognizes
that while a partner may be labeled a limited partner and indeed, for all
other purposes, is a limited partner, his agreement to take on personal
responsibility for a particular partnership debt thrusts the risk of loss on
him to that extent, and should justify a liability allocation to him; the
general partner, by contrast, should, to the same extent, be relegated to
the status of a limited partner for this purpose.
Second, this same recharacterization of one's status as a general or a
limited partner is mirrored in a related proposal:
62 Id. at 271.
68 Id. at 278.
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Any debt of a general partnership for which some but not all of the part-
ners are personally liable shall be allocated among the partners as it would
be in a limited partnership in which the personally-liable partners were the
general partners and the other partners were the limited partners. 4
This rule, like that discussed in the previous parargaph, addresses in part
both the characterization and the economic substance problems asso-
ciated with the current regulation.
The ALl proposal also fills a gap in the present regulation by provid-
ing that "nonrecourse debt in a general partnership shall be allocated
according to the same rules that apply to nonrecourse debt in a limited
partnership." 11 Again, this rule is needed if the current regulation is
to be retained.
In sum, while recognizing the problems created as a result of the
liability allocation rules of section 752, the ALI fails to propose ade-
quate solutions to these problems, particularly the difficult measurement
problems. The proposal maintains the need to distinguish between
recourse and nonrecourse debt, and between limited and general part-
ners. It maintains the need to determine profit and loss sharing ratios.
Even the ALI proposal with respect to nonrecourse debt, improvement
though it is, remains unsatisfactory: It is limited in its application solely
to nonrecourse debt, and it is restricted to "reasonable" allocations.
This latter restriction could well generate difficulties of its own as prac-
titioners and the Service struggle to define the boundaries of reasonable-
ness in innumerable partnership configurations.
New York State Bar Proposal
On May 7, 1985, the New York State Bar Association Section of
Taxation submitted a report to the Treasury and the Service containing
the section's recommendations for regulations to be issued pursuant to
the 1984 congressional directive. 0 The report makes recommendations
with respect to allocation under section 752 of both recourse and non-
recourse debt.
It recommends that as a general rule, recourse liability:
should be allocated to the partner who is liable for the debt, giving effect
to the agreements with the lenders and among the partners and to state law.
If the partnership agreement does not specify how partners share liability
for partnership debts, such obligations should be allocated among those
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 New York State Bar Association Tax Section, Report on Proposed Regula-
tions Pursuant to Sections 704(c), 707(aX2) and 752 (1985), reprinted in 85 TAx
NoTEs TODAY 102-57 (May 22, 1985) [hereinafter cited as New York State Bar
Report].
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partners against whom the lender has recourse in accordance with their
respective shares of losses.GT
The report gives several examples of the application of this proposed
standard, including one similar to the indemnification agreement in
Revenue Ruling 69-223. The report, like the ALI proposal, concludes
that the limited partner agreeing to indemnify a general partner should
be allocated a share of the liability.
The report adopts the rule of the present regulations that a limited
partner can share in recourse indebtedness only if the partner is required
to make an additional contribution to the partnership. It provides, how-
ever, that "a limited partner who assumes a partnership liability should
be able to include the amount of the assumed liability in his basis." "
A debt should be considered to be assumed for this purpose, the report
says, if a limited partner "through a pledge of property, direct assump-
tion of liability, or otherwise, shoulders the ultimate risk." "I The report
acknowledges that this standard is inconsistent with the position ex-
pressed in a 1983 technical advice memorandum. 70 Given the facts of
that memorandum, the report "would allow the inclusion of the amount
of the letter of credit in the limited partner's basis." 7
The report expresses general agreement with the present rule that non-
recourse debt is to be allocated in the same proportions that the partners
share in profits, but urges that the revised regulations "address those
situations in which partners share profits not in accordance with one
overall set of percentages but in a variety of different ways." 72 "In
particular," the report says, "if an allocation of profits will be respected
under section 704, such allocation should be given effect under section
752." 71 If one cannot determine from the partnership agreement what
the partners' respective shares of profits are, nonrecourse liabilities
should be allocated "in accordance with the partners' respective interests
in the partnership, determined on the basis of all the facts and circum-
stances. Such a determination should consider different allocations of
profits and the effect such allocations may have on the repayment of
partnership debts." 7
Finally, the report urges that the regulations under sections 704 and
752 be coordinated:
67 Id. at 69.
68 Id. at 72.
69 Id.
70 TAM 840412 (Oct. 13, 1983). See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying
text.
71 New York State Bar Report, supra note 66, at 73.
72 Id.
78 Id. at 74.
74 Id.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
[Vol. 41:TAX LAW REVIEW
HeinOnline  -- 41 Tax L. Rev. 194 1985-1986
PARTNERSHIP LIABILITIES
If a partner's deductions are deemed to be in accordance with his interest
in the partnership under the proposed Regulations under section 704, the
Committee believes that it is illogical that the partner may not use deduc-
tions because the basis for his partnership interest has not been increased
to permit such losses to be taken under section 704(d). Instead, the
Committee believes that the suggested rules, which would allocate basis
attributable to debt in accordance with economic benefit or risk, are con-
sistent with the approach under section 704 and should yield results which
are not inconsistent. 5
While modest in scope, these proposals address many of the economic
substance problems previously discussed. The proposals are broader
than those of the ALI, but suffer from some of the same shortcomings.
They retain the distinction between recourse and nonrecourse indebted-
ness. More importantly, they do not address the significant measure-
ment problems associated with the use of profit and loss ratios in allo-
cating liabilities. The proposals recommend that special allocations be
considered in determining profit and loss ratios, and yet provide no
guidance on how to determine the profit or loss ratio when a special
allocation is present. Further, the report suggests that if the partnership
agreement is unclear as to what the profit ratio is, nonrecourse liabilities
should be allocated in proportion to the partners' interests in the part-
nership, a standard that surely would be difficult to apply.
Perhaps the most significant proposal made by the report is that the
regulations under sections 704(b) and 752 be coordinated. As is dis-
cussed below, section 704(b) provides a significant roadblock to allo-
cations lacking economic substance. Since liability allocations under
section 752 are significant primarily in their effects on partners' ability
to deduct losses allocated to them, there is no reason why a loss alloca-
tion that passes muster under section 704(b) should be blocked by
section 752.
In sum, the New York State Bar report suggests some relief from the
problems associated with the present regulations under section 752; the
relief, however, like that in the ALI proposal, is inadequate.
Proposal: Flexible Allocation Standard
The difficulties inherent in any scheme that limits partners in the allo-
cation of partnership liabilities are probably insurmountable. The only
workable alternative to the present regulations is to permit partners to
allocate all liabilities, recourse and nonrecourse, among themselves as
they choose, and to permit reallocations on an annual basis.
This suggested standard might seem to be no standard at all, an
75 Id. at 76.
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alternative that would encourage tax avoidance. The only function of
section 752, however, is to incorporate certain fundamental tax princi-
ples into the partnership context-that is, to give partners basis for
liability taken on through the partnership format and to treat liability
reductions through a partnership as either reductions of the partners'
bases or as gain to be recognized by the partners. The proposed flexible
allocation standard would be consistent with this conception of the pur-
pose of section 752. It would limit the total of the outside basis created by
inside debt to the sum of partnership liabilities, and would require that
any reduction of partnership liability be treated as a distribution to
some partner or partners. The basis generating and destroying function
of section 752 does not require a policing of the allocation of basis in-
creases and decreases among partners.
The present regulations, and the alternatives suggested by the ALI
and the New York State Bar, arrogate to section 752 an additional func-
tion: to allocate debt among partners in a way assuring that no partner
has a basis for his interest that is greater than the losses he could be called
on to bear economically. But, it is the function of section 704(b)-
which invalidates any allocation of partnership income, gain, deduction,
or loss that lacks substantial economic effect-to deny tax effect to loss
allocations that do not square with allocations of economic risk.70 Sec-
tion 704(b) performs this task much more effectively and efficiently
than allocation regulations under section 752 ever could.
A brief primer on section 704(b) and the regulations promulgated
under that provision is needed to develop a fuller understanding of this
last point.
Regulations Under Section 704(b)
The present version of section 704(b) was enacted in 1976. Pro-
posed regulations under the provision were issued in 1983; 77 final
regulations were not adopted until December 1985.78
A governing principle of the regulations is that capital accounts must
be maintained and followed." In general, an allocation is valid only if
it is reflected as an appropriate increase or decrease in a partner's capital
76 Also, a loss allocation that is valid under § 704(b) may be made nonle-
ductible, at least temporarily, by the at risk rules of § 465, which limit loss deduc-
tions from most investments other than real estate to the amounts taxpayers have
at risk in the investments. If allocation rules under § 752 are calculated to closely
match each partner's outside basis with the amount of his exposure to economic
loss, § 752 also functions as an at risk limitation, and invades the province of
§ 465 as well as that of § 704(b).
77 Prop. Reg. § 1.704-1, 1983-1 C.B. 930.
78 Reg. § 1.704-1, (T.D. 8065 (Dec. 24, 1985)).
79 See Reg. § 1.704-1 (b) (2) (ii) (b).
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account and only if, on liquidation, each partner is entitled to a distribu-
tion of the amount shown in his capital account. Therefore, a tax alloca-
tion of a dollar of income, gain, deduction, or loss to a partner is valid only
if it increases or decreases the partner's potential entitlement on liquida-
tion by a dollar. If, for example, depreciation deductions are specially
allocated to one partner, section 704(b) invalidates this allocation
unless that partner's capital account is reduced by the depreciation allo-
cated to him. As a result, if the depreciation becomes an economic loss,
this partner will bear it. Likewise, if a bottom line loss is allocated to
one partner, section 704(b) gives effect to the allocation only if this
partner bears the loss economically.
An allocation that creates or increases a deficit in the capital account
of a partner is valid under the regulations only if any partner with "a
deficit balance in his capital account following the liquidation of his
interest in the partnership . . . is unconditionally obligated to restore
the amount of such deficit balance to the partnership, which amount
shall, upon liquidation of the partnership, be paid to creditors of the
partnership or distributed to other partners in accordance with their
positive capital account balances." " If, for example, a special alloca-
tion of depreciation to a partner increases a deficit in the partner's capi-
tal account, the allocation is valid only if it exposes the partner to the
possibility of having to make up this allocation with a cash contribution
on liquidation.
In addition to the requirement to follow the capital accounts, the
regulations, consistent with the mandate of section 704(b), require that
"the economic effect of [an] allocation must be substantial." "I The
regulations further provide that, in general: "The economic effect of an
allocation . . . is substantial if there is a reasonable possibility that the
allocation . . . will affect substantially the dollar amounts to be re-
ceived by the partners from the partnership independent of the tax con-
sequences." 82
Example 7(ii) of the regulations demonstrates the operation of the
substantiality requirement. In the example, a two person partnership
has invested equal dollar amounts in tax-exempt bonds and corporate
stock. One partner is allocated 90% of the first $10,000 of dividend
income from the corporate stock and the other partner, who is expected
to be in a higher marginal tax bracket, is allocated 90% of the first
$10,000 of interest income from the tax-exempt bonds. The allocation
is only for the first year of the partnership. All other income of the
80 Reg. § 1.704-1(b) (2) (ii) (b) (3).
81 Reg. § 1.704-1 (b) (2) (i).
82 Reg. § 1704-1(b) (2) (iii) (a).
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partnership for the year will be allocated equally between the partners.
If at the time the agreement was made "[tihere is a strong likelihood...
that in the first taxable year of the partnership the partnership will earn
more than $10,000 of tax-exempt interest and more than $10,000 of tax-
able dividends," the allocation is not valid because the "economic effect
is not substantial." 81 There is, rather, "a strong likelihood . . . that
at the end of the [one] year period to which such allocations relate, the
net increases and decreases to the [partners'] capital accounts will be the
same with such allocations as they would have been in the absence of
such allocations, and that the total taxes of [the partners] will be reduced
as a result of such allocations." 84
The basic point of the regulations is that tax allocations must be
matched with economic consequences. Generally, a tax item (that is,
an item of gross income, deduction, or loss) is mirrored, at least poten-
tially, by an economic consequence. A tax loss, for example, is a deduc-
tion for an economic loss that either has occurred or could occur in the
future. If the loss is incurred by a partnership, the regulations require
that the tax deduction be allocated to the partner or partners who bear
the economic loss or the risk of economic loss.
This matching of tax and economic consequences is not possible when
a deduction or loss is attributable to nonrecourse debt. The proposed
regulations provided that a deduction or loss is attributable to nonre-
course debt to the extent of any resulting excess of the debt over the
adjusted basis of the property that secures it."5 Such a loss is borne
economically by the nonrecourse lender, but is deductible by the owner
of the property that secures the debt. If the property is owned by a
partnership, the loss must be allocated among the partners, even though
none of the partners bears the economic burden of the loss.
The statutory mandate that no allocation of partnership income, gain,
deduction, or credit be given effect unless it has substantial economic
effect thus cannot be fully effectuated for losses attributable to nonrecourse
debt. The proposed regulations, in their most controversial provisions,
generally allowed these losses to be allocated in whatever way the part-
ners choose. The principal limitation on this freedom is that subse-
quent tax items must be allocated consistently. The final regulations,
reflecting the controversy, did not adopt the provisions of the proposed
regulations, or any provisions, regarding allocations attributable to non-
recourse debt. The issue thus remains unsettled.
A loss attributable to nonrecourse debt is nearly always matched
83 Reg. § 1.704-1(b) (5) Ex. 7(Hi).
84 Reg. § 1.704-1 (b) (5) Ex. 7(i).
85 Prop. Reg. § 1.704-1 (b) (4) (iv).
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some time in the future by a recognition of an identical amount of in-
come or gain. Assume a partnership purchases a building for $1,000,
paying $900 of the price with money borrowed on a nonrecourse basis.
Depreciation deductions of $300 are taken, which reduce the adjusted
basis of the property to $700. The partnership breaks even in cash
flow, and tax losses thus equal the depreciation of $300. If the in-
debtedness has remained at $900, $200 of the $300 loss is attributable
to the nonrecourse debt. It is unlikely that the partnership's investment
can be wound up without the recognition of $200 of income or gain to
parallel the $200 loss attributable to nonrecourse debt. If the partner-
ship allows the lender to foreclose on the property, for example, the
excess of the liability ($900) over the adjusted basis ($700) is gain
to the partnership on the foreclosure. 80 If the debt is paid from rents
generated by the property, $200 of the $900 will have to be paid from
after-tax dollars because only $700 of depreciation remains. Generally,
any transaction that eliminates or narrows the gap between the principal
amount of the debt and the adjusted basis of the property generates
income or gain in like amount.
Very generally, the proposed regulations would require that this in-
come or gain be allocated in the same way as the earlier losses attributable
to nonrecourse debt. More specifically, losses attributable to nonrecourse
debt would be charged against the capital accounts of the partners to
whom the losses were allocated, under the rules described earlier. In
addition, any partner with a capital account deficit resulting from an
allocation of loss attributable to nonrecourse indebtedness would be
allocated income or gain from that property to the extent of the differ-
ence between the outstanding principal balance of the nonrecourse in-
debtedness and the adjusted basis of the property securing that in-
debtedness. 87
Relatiouship of Section 752 to Section 704(b)
Because section 704(b) and the regulations thereunder assure, to the
extent possible, that a partner who is allocated the tax deduction for a
partnership loss will also bear the economic burdens of the loss, there is
no need for a completely separate standard under section 752 to accom-
plish the same result. Indeed, as indicated by the present state of affairs,
separate standards only engender confusion, create serious inconsistency,
and fail to reflect economic substance. Just as section 704(b) permits
partners to allocate tax items in any manner the partners choose so long
as the allocations have substantial economic effect, so, too, section 752
86 Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983).
87Prop. Reg. § 1.704-1(b) (4) (iv).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
1986]
HeinOnline  -- 41 Tax L. Rev. 199 1985-1986
should give partners broad authority to allocate liabilities. It is certainly
anomalous that section 752, in conjunction with section 704(d), can
deny a partner the immediate benefit of a deduction when it has been
determined under section 704(b) that the allocation of the deduction to
the partner has substantial economic effect.
Assume X and Y form a general partnership, each partner contribut-
ing $100. The partnership purchases depreciable property for $1,000,
paying $800 of the purchase price with a nonrecourse borrowing. The
partnership agreement provides for equal sharing of profits and losses,
except that a special allocation of all depreciation is made to X. Alloca-
tions are appropriately reflected in capital accounts. The partnership
agreement requires that capital account deficits be made up on liquida-
tion, and allocates to X income and gain as required by the rules of the
proposed regulations on losses attributable to nonrecourse debt. X's
basis for his partnership interest is apparently $500, the sum of his cash
contribution and one half of the indebtedness. Once X has been allo-
cated $500 of depreciation and loss, X's basis will be zero, and section
704(d) will bar him from further deductions. This will be so even
though the allocation of depreciation to X satisfies section 704(b).
Since the proposed section 704(b) rules on nonrecourse indebtedness
treat a partner in the same way as an individual taxpayer, there is no
reason why the partners should not have as much freedom in allocating
liabilities as they do in allocating depreciation and losses. Given this
freedom, X could be allocated the entire debt, giving him a $900 basis
that would support most of the depreciation deductions.
Y, the other partner, is not harmed by this allocation of the liability
to X. While it would leave Y's basis at $100, the amount of his contri-
bution, Y is not allocated income, gain, or loss associated with the non-
recourse indebtedness. Y thus does not bear the burden imposed on
taxpayers who benefit from deductions associated with nonrecourse in-
debtedness.
Given the existence of a partnership liability, indicating that for tax
purposes an investment has been made by the partnership, the flexible
allocation standard essentially proposes that it is for the partners to de-
cide among themselves who has made the investment, bears its burden,
and receives its benefit. The policy goal of restricting trafficking in
losses is adequately served by section 704(b), and would not be under-
mined by the flexible allocation standard.
Application of Flexible Allocation Standard
The following hypotheticals demonstrate the application of the sug-
gested flexible allocation standard in a variety of situations:
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Hypothetical 1
G is the general partner and L is the limited partner of the GL limited
partnership. As a result of partnership operations and distributions, G
and L each have capital accounts of zero and zero bases for their part-
nership interests. The partnership borrows $200 on a recourse note,
and uses the borrowing to construct a building. G, the general partner,
is personally liable on the debt. L has no personal liability. The loan,
however, is secured by the building, which has a value greater than the
principal amount of the loan, and it is expected that the cash flow from
the building will be sufficient to service the loan. The partnership agree-
ment entitles L to all depreciation deductions. The agreement also re-
quires that capital accounts be followed on liquidation, and requires L
to restore any deficit in his capital account that exists when the partner-
ship liquidates. Partner G, however, bears the risk of any decline in the
building value in excess of allowable depreciation deductions.
Under section 1.752-1(e) of the regulations, none of the $200 lia-
bility is allocated to L because the liability is recourse and L has no
obligation to contribute further to the partnership. 8 L's basis, there-
fore, remains zero. The allocation of the depreciation deductions to L is
valid under section 704(b), but, because L has a zero basis, section
704(d) prevents L from taking the deductions currently. The deduc-
tions will be held in abeyance until L has a basis in his partnership in-
terest. That the debt is adequately secured by the building and that the
cash flow of the partnership will be used to service the debt does not
change the result.
The proposed flexible allocation standard would permit results more
consistent with the agreement of the partners. Even though the liability
is recourse and L has no fixed obligation to contribute further, L could
be allocated the entire liability, giving him a basis of $200. With this
basis, L could immediately use the depreciation deductions.
The deductions would put L's capital account into deficit. The part-
nership agreement would make L liable to G to restore the capital ac-
count to zero in the event of liquidation. In effect, L would agree to in-
demnify G, to the extent of L's capital account deficit, for amounts that
G might be required to pay on the recourse indebtedness. If, for exam-
88 The partnership agreement obligates L to contribute to the partnership in the
event of liquidation to make up any deficit then existing in L's capital account.
Arguably, this is an obligation to contribute that entitles L to share in recourse
debt under the present regulations. The Service, however, would doubtlessly re-
gard this obligation as too contingent to justify any such participation. See TAM
8404012 and TAM 8421004, discussed in the text accompanying notes 33-40.
See also Pritchett v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 580 (1985).
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ple, the indebtedness were foreclosed, and G had to satisfy a deficiency
judgment, L's obligation to restore the deficit in his capital account
would make G whole, except to the extent the deficiency exceeded the
deficit. Thus, L is indirectly liable on the recourse liability to the extent
of the deficit, even though L is not personally liable to creditors. G's
liability may be more apparent than real.8 9 The basis increase associated
with the recourse liability is appropriately L's and not G's,
Assume that after L deducts $100 of depreciation on the building,
the partnership sells the property for its book value of $100, and liqui-
dates. Assume $200 remains owing on the loan. L's capital account is
$100 in deficit, and, under the partnership agreement, L must contribute
this amount to the partnership. This $100 and the $100 proceeds of the
sale would be paid to the creditor. After restoring the $100, L's capital
account, like G's, would be zero. Neither partner would receive any-
thing in the liquidation. L, having benefited from the depreciation de-
ductions, would also have borne the economic burden of the depre-
ciation.
This hypothetical demonstrates several important aspects of the flexi-
ble allocation standard. First, the standard enables L to use deductions
which, under section 704(b), are validly allocated to him. Under the
existing regulations, the allocation of the deductions, although proper
under section 704(b), is rendered useless by sections 752 and 704(d).
Second, the flexible allocation standard produces results reflective of
economic substance because L bears the economic burden associated
with the deductions allocated to him. When the tax depreciation is
matched by economic depreciation, L suffers a dollar of economic loss
for every dollar of deduction allocated to him. Even though G is per-
sonally responsible for the loan, the allocation of the liability to L is
economically sound, given L's obligation to restore deficits in L's capital
account. Section 704(b), as interpreted by the regulations, assures that
when a partnership has a loss attributable to a recourse borrowing, the
partner to whom the loss is allocated bears, at least indirectly, the eco-
nomic burden of the debt. Any allocation of liabilities that parallels the
partner's allocations under section 704(b) thus necessarily has eco-
nomic substance.
89 G's liability, of course, is not always illusory. If the building burned down
uninsured the day after purchase, L would have no depreciation deductions, no
capital account deficit, and the loss would be borne by 0. Indeed# if for whatever
reason the building declined in value in excess of allowable depreciation deduc-
tions, G bears a real risk of loss. Nonetheless, the possibility that G might, in
some circumstances, bear the loss should not obscure the genuine liability L takes
on as depreciation deductions are passed through to L and his capital account be-
comes negative.
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Hypothetical 2
G and L form a limited partnership, each contributing $100. The
partnership purchases a building for $400, borrowing $200 of the pur-
chase price without recourse and giving a mortgage on the building as
security. Income, gains, deductions, and losses will be shared equally, ex-
cept that the first $300 of depreciation will be allocated to L and the
balance of the depreciation will be allocated to G. Gain on a disposition
of the building will be allocated first to each partner in amounts equal to
the depreciation previously allocated to him. The partnership agreement
also requires each partner to make up any deficit in his capital account
on liquidation, except to the extent the deficit results from allocations
of depreciation deductions attributable to nonrecourse debt.
Assume the flexible allocation standard is in effect, and the partners
agree to allocate the liability to L. As a result, L's basis is $300, while
G's basis is $100. L's capital account is $100. Assume L takes $300 in
depreciation deductions. If the principal amount of the debt remains at
$200, the last $100 of these deductions is attributable to nonrecourse
debt, under the definition of the proposed regulations, because it causes
the adjusted basis of the property to fall $100 below the amount of the
debt. L's basis is reduced to zero and his capital account to a negative
$200. The remaining $100 of depreciation deductions (all attributable
to nonrecourse debt) would be allocated to G under the agreement.
But, assume the partnership sells the property for $200, and liqui-
dates before any depreciation is allocated to G. Gain on the sale is $100.
All of the gain is attributable to the nonrecourse debt. Because $100 of
L's capital account deficit was caused by the allocation to him of de-
preciation attributable to noarecourse debt, the proposed regulations
provide that the gain, all being attributable to nonrecourse debt, must
be allocated to L.9° This raises L's basis to $100 and his capital account
to negative $100. Because this $100 of deficit is not attributable to non-
recourse debt, the partnership agreement requires that L make it up
with a $100 contribution to the partnership. This contribution raises
L's basis to $200 and his capital account to zero. When the $200 debt
is paid, the payment is treated as a distribution of $200 to L, reducing
L's basis from $200 to zero. After payment of the debt, the partnership
has $100 of cash, which is distributable to G in payment of the balance
in his capital account. The distribution reduces G's basis to zero.
Neither G nor L recognizes gain or loss on liquidation.
In sum, L contributes $100 at the outset, takes depreciation deduc-
tions of $300, reports $100 of gain, and contributes an additional $100
to make up his capital account deficit on liquidation. The $300 of de-
90 See Prop. Reg. § 1.704-1(b) (4) (iv).
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preciation deductions consist of $100 attributable to his own contribu-
tion, $100 attributable to G's contribution,"' and $100 attributable to
nonrecourse liability. The allocation of the first $200 of these deduc-
tions is matched by an economic loss of $200, consisting of the $100
contributed on the organization of the partnership and $100 contributed
to make up the capital account deficit on liquidation. The last $100 of
the depreciation allocation is matched by an allocation of $100 of gain.
The flexible allocation standard, when limited by the rules under sec-
tion 704(b), produces results which are economically sound and are
consistent with general tax principles.92
The present regulations would presumably require that some of the
nonrecourse debt, perhaps one half of it, be allocated to G. This would
have the effect of limiting L's beginning basis to something less than
$300, and would thus effectively deny him the benefit of some of the
depreciation allocated to him. The provisions of the partnership agree-
ment required to give validity to the allocation under section 704(b),
however, expose L to either a risk of economic loss or the certainty of a
future allocation of income or gain each time depreciation is allocated
to him. These provisions give economic substance to the arrangement.
The additional restraints imposed under the present regulations by sec-
tions 752 and 704(b) are arbitrary, and make the law less reflective of
economic substance, not more. No revision of the section 752 regula-
tions, short of an adoption of the flexible allocation standard, would
alleviate this arbitrariness.
91 This is so because (1) the first $200 of depreciation is attributable to the
partnership's equity in the property and hence to the partner's $200 of contribu-
tions, (2) L is allocated all of the first $200 of depreciation, and (3) L is thus
allocated the depreciation attributable to the contributions of both himself and G.
92 The flexible allocation standard, however, would not guarantee that alloca-
tions valid under § 704(b) would never be frustrated by § 704(d). If L were
allocated all $400 of the depreciation on the property, the allocation of the last
$100 could be valid under § 704(b), but would be blocked, at least temporarily,
by section 704(d), even under the flexible allocation standard. Under this stn-
dard, L's basis cannot exceed $300, the sum of his $100 contribution and the
liability of $200. The regulations under § 704(b) effectively allow the benefit of
G's contribution to be assigned to L for purposes of allocations of deductions and
losses. See supra note 91. No existing provision, however, allows one partner's
contribution to be assigned to another partner for basis purposes.
If L is obligated to restore a deficit in his capital account, there is no conceptual
reason to preclude the partners from giving L rather than G basis for G's con-
tribution. Indeed, G's contribution could be restructured either as a loan to L,
who thereupon contributes the money to the partnership, or as a loan to the part-
nership with the resulting partnership liability allocated entirely to L under the
flexible standard. In either case, L would achieve sufficient basis for § 704(d)
purposes. However, while it may be conceptually appealing to permit one partner
to loan his basis due to contribution to another partner, such a proposal is beyond
the scope of § 752 and of this article.
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Reallocations
The flexible allocation standard, in addition to giving complete free-
dom in the initial allocation of liabilities among the partners, would also
freely allow reallocations of liabilities in subsequent years. It would
therefore enable partners to direct basis increases and decreases from
time to time where they would do the most good. This subsequent shift-
ing may seem more problematical than the initial allocations of liability
demonstrated in Hypotheticals 1 and 2. Consider the following hypo-
thetical:
Hypothetical 3
GL is a limited partnership in which G is the general partner and L
is the limited partner. The partnership agreement allocates all losses to
L for five years, and provides for equal sharing of subsequent profits and
losses. The agreement contains all the provisions necessary to make
these allocations valid under section 704(b). Pursuant to the flexible
allocation standard, the partners allocate a $500 recourse liability to L.
Partnership losses are incurred during the first five years that reduce L's
basis for his partnership interest to zero, and leaves him with a deficit of
$250 in his capital account. None of the $500 liability has been repaid.
The flexible allocation standard would allow the partners to reallo-
cate the liability. If they agreed to reallocate the liability to G, for ex-
ample, G's basis would be increased by $500. The objection might be
made that the reallocation would allow G to deduct an additional $500
of loss; that is, it would allow the liability to be used a second time in
supplying basis to support loss deductions. The $500 liability would
support $1,000 of loss. Once G deducted the additional $500 of loss,
furthermore, the liability could be reallocated to L, giving him $500 of
basis and allowing him to deduct another $500 of loss. By a series of
well timed reallocations, the $500 liability could be passed back and forth
between the partners to become the foundation of loss deductions of
infinite magnitude.
The objection, however, is premised on an accounting impossibility.
Partnership losses, net of partnership profits, can never exceed the sum
of the partners' contributions and partnership liabilities. Once net losses
equal the sum of the contributions and liabilities, there can be no more
losses until the contributions or liabilities are increased. Thus, a reallo-
cation of a liability that has been used as the basis for a loss deduction
would only create useless basis.
To illustrate, suppose G and L each contribute $50 to the GL part-
nership when it is organized. The partnership buys depreciable property
for $600, paying the price with the money contributed by the partners
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
1986] 205
HeinOnline  -- 41 Tax L. Rev. 205 1985-1986
and $500 borrowed on a recourse basis. During the first five years,
when losses are only allocable to L, the partnership has losses of $550.
If the liability is initially allocated to L under the flexible allocation
standard, the losses equal L's beginning basis, and are fully deductible.
Assume the liability is reallocated to G for the sixth and subsequent
years. The reallocation raises G's basis to $550, and would seem to set
the stage for deductions by G of up to $550 of subsequent losses. If the
partnership acquires no liabilities beyond the $500 borrowed to pur-
chase the property, however, subsequent losses cannot exceed $50.
Assume, first, that the partnership breaks even in cash flow, and that
partnership losses consist of depreciation. Only $600 of depreciation is
allowable over the life of the property. L took $550 of this depreciation,
and only $50 remains for G. Assume, second, that the partnership has
cash flow losses, and that the tax losses include both depreciation and
cash flow losses. The losses subsequent to the fifth year are not limited to
$50 in this case, but each dollar of cash flow loss must be financed either
by contributions from the partners or by partnership debt. A partnership
cannot lose money that it neither has nor owes. The losses subsequent
to the fifth year, therefore, cannot exceed the sum of $50 and the new
liabilities incurred. The losses could be made fully deductible to G by
allocating the new liabilities to him; the reallocation of the original
$500 liability is not necessary or even helpful.
Assume G arranges to sell his interest for $250 at the beginning of
the sixth year. The basis of his interest is $50, the amount of his con-
tribution. His gain on the sale is $200. But, suppose $200 of the part-
nership liability is reallocated to G just before the sale. Would the
reallocation give G basis sufficient to wipe out the gain? No, because a
partner's share of partnership liabilities is included in the amount real-
ized on the sale of his partnership interest. 8 After the reallocation, G's
amount realized is $450 (the sum of the selling price of $250 and the
liability share of $200), and the gain remains at $200.
Thus, a reallocation of a liability already used by a partner as the
basis for a loss deduction creates no opportunity for manipulation
whether the partner to whom the liability is reallocated is contemplating
an allocation of partnership loss or a disposition of his interest.
Further, such a reallocation entails a real cost to the partner from
whom it is allocated. When the $500 liability is reallocated from L to G,
section 752(b) treats L as having received a distribution of $500 cash.
L's basis at the time of the deemed distribution is zero. Under section
731(a) (1), any excess of a money distribution over the basis of the
distributee's interest is recognized as gain. Therefore, L recognizes gain
of $500.
98 I.R.C. § 752(c).
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Liability reallocations, if allowed as proposed under the flexible allo-
cation standard, thus could not be used as tools of manipulation. Rather,
reallocations would be useful only as mid-course corrections. If an
allocation of liability were made to allow a particular partner to absorb
anticipated losses or deductions, but the losses or deductions proved to
be less than expected, for example, a reallocation could be made so that
liability would not be stranded in the basis of a partner who could
never use it. To deny the right to reallocate would simply be to provide
a bonus for partners whose prognostications of the future come closest
to realization. No rational tax policy requires such a bonus.
If the flexible allocation standard were adopted to only apply to initial
allocations, and there was no right to reallocate, furthermore, the pro-
hibition on reallocations would be difficult to enforce. A shifting of the
allocation could often be achieved by the simple expedient of refinanc-
ing the liability, f necessary with a different creditor.
In sum, even in the context of reallocations, the flexible standard
produces economically sound results. The standard is simple, and
negates the inconsistences between the operation of sections 752 and
704(b). Most importantly, it resolves the many problems associated
with the current regulations. The flexible allocation standard offers the
opportunity to avoid the tax consequences of present law that serve no
sound tax policy; the ability to make reallocations as events unfold
should also serve to offset to a considerable degree the untoward tax
consequences that an initial allocation may threaten.
Failure to Allocate
Adoption of the flexible allocation standard would necessitate a rule
for situations where the partners either neglect to determine the alloca-
tion of a liability, or are unable to reach agreement on an allocation.
There are several potential solutions to the allocation issue in the absence
of partnership agreement. One approach would be to apply the existing
regulations.
Alternatively, the regulations could be amended to provide-as the
regulations under section 704(b) do with respect to special allocations
that lack substantial economic effect-that the allocation be made in
accordance with the partners' interests in the partnership, with a rebut-
table presumption that those interests are equal. Any arbitrariness and
uncertainty such a rule would entail, although undesirable, could be
defended on the grounds that it is within the partners' power to avoid
such a result.
As yet another alternative, the regulations could say that in the ab-
sence of agreement under the flexible allocation standard, the bar of
section 704(d) should be minimized by allocating liabilities at year's
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
1986]
HeinOnline  -- 41 Tax L. Rev. 207 1985-1986
end to those partners with negative capital account balances. Any excess
liabilities could then be allocated among all the partners in accordance
with their loss sharing ratios, which reflects the approach of the existing
regulations. Such a position would serve to minimize harm to partners
who do not reach agreement, while preserving the flexible standard for
those partnerships that do reach agreement.
Conclusion
The Tax Reform Act of 1984 requires that the Treasury "prescribe
regulations relating to liabilities, including the treatment of guarantees,
assumptions, indemnity agreements, and similar arrangements." 94 The
conference report states that the revision "should be based largely on the
manner in which the partners share the economic risk of loss with respect
to partnership debt, other than bona fide nonrecourse debt. With respect
to nonrecourse debt, the conferees do not expect that the regulations will
make major changes to the manner in which the partners' shares are de-
termined, but may attempt to provide more certainty than presently
exists." 95
The flexible allocation standard proposed here obviously was not con-
templated by the conferees. The conference report, on the contrary,
refers to the distinctions of the present regulations between recourse and
nonrecourse debt and between general and limited partners. Nonethe-
less, there is no conflict between the statutory mandate for new section
752 regulations, and the flexible allocation standard.
Indeed, in substance, there is essential harmony between the two. The
principal message of the conference report is that allocations of partner-
ship liabilities, in order to be respected for tax purposes, should reflect
the partner's economic risk of loss. The flexible allocation standard
applopriately leaves to section 704(b) the determination of whether
tax allocations are sufficiently imbued with economic risk. Permitting
the flexible standard to determine basis does not impinge on the require-
ment that tax losses or deductions have economic substance. The em-
phasis the present regulations place on the distinctions between recourse
and nonrecourse debt, and general and limited partners, is not required
by statute. The need to revise those regulations creates an opportunity
to achieve simplicity and certainty under section 752, fully consistent
with the directive to ground those regulations in the stuff of economic
substance.
94 Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 79(b), 98 Stat. 494, 597 (1984).
95 H.R. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 869 (1984), reprinted in 1984-3
C.B. (vol. 2) 123.
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